The article below is extracted from a longer one published by Reuters today. I should emphasise that it is NOT an opinion piece, but instead has the full and disinterested weight of Reuters behind it. I'm afraid the translation is not very good; I used Google Translate and then did a minimum amount of "tidying up".
It is, I'm afraid, a damning indictment of Nicolas Sarkozy, but not of course a ringing endorsement of the Socialists as they would have done far worse.
The upshot is that we are lumbered with a largely discredited government and a completely useless opposition.
When Nicolas Sarkozy became president, the country already had a bad reputation: since the creation of the euro, France had systematically violated its commitments to reduce the deficit and even, sometimes, the Stability and Growth Pact which limited deficit to 3% of GDP and debt to 60%.
Far from reversing this trend, the newly elected Nicolas Sarkozy went to Brussels to inform his European partners that once again, France would not respect its commitments and instead pursue a policy of "growth".
In France, the election promises were quickly implemented: the "tax package" in the summer of 2007 lowered taxes for the rich and created new exemptions. The public deficit, which had dropped every year since 2003, started to rise again.
Swollen by the worsening crisis, new tax cuts and new expenditure, the deficit rose to a peak of 7.5% of GDP in 2009 (the highest in 50 years), barely falling in 2010 to 7.1%.
As the deficit and debt worsened, more warnings were issued.
WARNINGS BRUSHED ASIDE
The Court of Auditors, the independent body which audits the public accounts in France, the leading international institutions and economists all warned the authorities about the dangerous path of the public accounts of France.
The first president of the Court of Auditors, Philippe Séguin, warned the government in no uncertain terms: if nothing was done, France ran the risk of seeing its debt spiralling out of control.
His successor, Didier Migaud, said that the country's AAA rating could be threatened.
Prime Minister Francois Fillon seemed to get the message, saying in 2007 that he was running a "bankrupt" country.
But the government continued to enact costly measures.
Advertising on public television was partially removed, and despite alarm bells on public finances already ringing, the VAT rate for restaurants was lowered.
This measure alone neutralised the savings made by the suppression of 150,000 civil service posts in five years (intended to demonstrate the government's determination to reddress the public accounts).
.....
To those experts who warned of the dangers month after month, the government replied that they were being over-pessimistic and failed to give it credit for the "historic" efforts being made.
Public debt rose from from 63.9% of GDP at the end of 2007 to 86.2% at the end of June 2011.
....The government chose to redress the accounts slowly and gently, eschewing the drastic cuts introduced in Britain or the harsh austerity measures imposed on the "peripheral" countries.
The goal, it said, was to "go easy" on the French since consumption was the traditional lever for growth in France.
As long as the crisis appeared to be confined to the little countries on the periphery of Europe, this strategy was not strongly criticised by economists.
The pension reform, carried out in the teeth of strong opposition, showed that the government was capable of making tough decisions. But even here, more reforms will be required.
And as the crisis spread over Europe, the feeling gained ground that France was longer completely in control of its destiny.
It is, I'm afraid, a damning indictment of Nicolas Sarkozy, but not of course a ringing endorsement of the Socialists as they would have done far worse.
The upshot is that we are lumbered with a largely discredited government and a completely useless opposition.
When Nicolas Sarkozy became president, the country already had a bad reputation: since the creation of the euro, France had systematically violated its commitments to reduce the deficit and even, sometimes, the Stability and Growth Pact which limited deficit to 3% of GDP and debt to 60%.
Far from reversing this trend, the newly elected Nicolas Sarkozy went to Brussels to inform his European partners that once again, France would not respect its commitments and instead pursue a policy of "growth".
In France, the election promises were quickly implemented: the "tax package" in the summer of 2007 lowered taxes for the rich and created new exemptions. The public deficit, which had dropped every year since 2003, started to rise again.
Swollen by the worsening crisis, new tax cuts and new expenditure, the deficit rose to a peak of 7.5% of GDP in 2009 (the highest in 50 years), barely falling in 2010 to 7.1%.
As the deficit and debt worsened, more warnings were issued.
WARNINGS BRUSHED ASIDE
The Court of Auditors, the independent body which audits the public accounts in France, the leading international institutions and economists all warned the authorities about the dangerous path of the public accounts of France.
The first president of the Court of Auditors, Philippe Séguin, warned the government in no uncertain terms: if nothing was done, France ran the risk of seeing its debt spiralling out of control.
His successor, Didier Migaud, said that the country's AAA rating could be threatened.
Prime Minister Francois Fillon seemed to get the message, saying in 2007 that he was running a "bankrupt" country.
But the government continued to enact costly measures.
Advertising on public television was partially removed, and despite alarm bells on public finances already ringing, the VAT rate for restaurants was lowered.
This measure alone neutralised the savings made by the suppression of 150,000 civil service posts in five years (intended to demonstrate the government's determination to reddress the public accounts).
.....
To those experts who warned of the dangers month after month, the government replied that they were being over-pessimistic and failed to give it credit for the "historic" efforts being made.
Public debt rose from from 63.9% of GDP at the end of 2007 to 86.2% at the end of June 2011.
....The government chose to redress the accounts slowly and gently, eschewing the drastic cuts introduced in Britain or the harsh austerity measures imposed on the "peripheral" countries.
The goal, it said, was to "go easy" on the French since consumption was the traditional lever for growth in France.
As long as the crisis appeared to be confined to the little countries on the periphery of Europe, this strategy was not strongly criticised by economists.
The pension reform, carried out in the teeth of strong opposition, showed that the government was capable of making tough decisions. But even here, more reforms will be required.
And as the crisis spread over Europe, the feeling gained ground that France was longer completely in control of its destiny.
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